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The major contributions of twentieth century econometrics to knowledge were the definition of
causal parameters when agents are constrained by resources and markets and causes are interrelated, the
analysis of what is required to recover causal parameters from data (the identification problem), and
clarification of the role of causal parameters in policy evaluation and in forecasting the effects of policies
never previously experienced.  This paper summarizes the development of those ideas by the Cowles
Commission, the response to their work by structural econometricians and VAR econometricians, and the
response to structural and VAR econometrics by calibrators, advocates of natural and social experiments,
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   1. Introduction
This paper considers the definition and identification of causal parameters in economics and
their role in econometric policy analysis. It assesses different research programs designed to recover
causal parameters from data.
At the beginning of this century, economic theory was mainly intuitive and empirical support
for it was largely anecdotal. At the end of the century, economics has a rich array of formal
models and a high-quality data base. Empirical regularities motivate theory in many areas of
economics and data are routinely used to test theory. Many economic theories have been developed
as measurement frameworks to suggest what data should be collected and how they should be
interpreted.
Econometric theory was developed to analyze and interpret economic data. Most econometric
theory adapts methods originally developed in statistics. The major exception to this rule is the
econometric analysis of the identification problem and the companion analyses of structural equa-
tions, causality, and economic policy evaluation. Although an economist did not invent the phrase
"correlation does not imply causation,"1 economists clarified the meaning of causation within well-
specified models, the requirements for a causal interpretation of an empirical relationship, and the
reasons why a causal framework is necessary for evaluating economic policies.2
The fundamental work was done by economists associated with the Cowles Commission.3
The lasting legacy of this research program includes the concepts of exogenous (external) and
endogenous (internal) variables, and the notions of "policy invariant parameters" and "structural
parameters" which have entered everyday parlance inside and outside of economics.
Just as the ancient Hebrews were "the people of the book," economists are "the people of
the model." Formal economic models are logically consistent systems within which hypothetical
'The phrase is generally attributed to Karl Pearson.
2For example, the artificial intelligence community has just begun to appreciate the contributions of econometrics
to the definition and identification of causal relationships. See the papers in Glymour and Cooper (1999) and the
paper by Pearl (1998).
3The Cowles Commission was founded by Alfred Cowles to promote the synthesis of mathematics and economics.
Cowles and the Cowles Commission played a leading role in creating the Econometric Society. It was originally
based in Colorado Springs and had a loose organizational arrangement with Colorado College. It was relocated to
the University of Chicago from 1939 to 1955. See Christ (1952, reprinted 1995), Epstein (1987) and Morgan (1990)
for valuable histories of econometrics and the role of the Cowles Commission in defining modern econometrics.
1"thought experiments" can be conducted to examine the effects of changes in parameters and
constraints on outcomes. Within a model, the effects on outcomes of variation in constraints facing
agents in a market setting are well defined. Comparative statics exercises formalize Marshall's
notion of a ceteris paribus change which is what economists mean by a causal effect. In his own
words,
"It is sometimes said that the laws of economics are 'hypothetical'. Of course, like
every other science, ii undertakes to study the effects which will be produced by certain
causes, not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things are equal and
that the causes are able to work out their effects undisturbed. Almost every scientific
doctrine, when carefully and formally stated, will be found to contain some proviso to
the effect that other things are equal; the action of the causes in question is supposed
to be isolated; certain effects are attributed to them, but only on the hypothesis that no
cause is permitted to enter except those distinctly allowed for "(A. Marshall, 1920, p.
86).
The "other things are equal" or ceteris paribus clause is a cornerstone of economic analysis.4
Defining causality within a model is relatively straightforward when the causes can be inde-
pendently varied.5 Defining causality when the causes are interrelated is less straightforward and
is a major achievement of econometrics. Recovering causal parameters from data is not straight-
forward. An important contribution of econometric thought was the formalization of the notion
developed in philosophy that many different theoretical models and hence many different causal
interpretations may be consistent with the same data. In economics, this is called the problem of
identification. The econometric analysis of the identification problem clarifies the limits of purely
empirical knowledge. It makes precise the idea that correlation is not causation by using fully
specified economic models as devices for measuring and interpreting causal parameters. It presents
conditions under which the hypothetical variations mentioned in the quotation from Marshall, or
the structural parameters of well-specified economic models, can in principle be identified from
data. Different a priori assumptions can identify the same causal parameter or identify different
causal parameters. The key insight in the literature of twentieth century econometrics was the
discovery of the conditional nature of empirical knowledge. The justification for interpreting an
4Marshall himself does not use the phrase "ceterzs parthus" in his book.
5Marini and Singer (1988) present a valuable summary of the rancorous and confusing debates about the nature
of causal laws developed in model-free fields.
2empirical association causally hinges on the assumptions required to identify the causal parameters
from the data.
This paper proceeds in the following way. (1) The concept of a causal parameter is defined
in an economic setting that respects the constraints imposed by preferences, endowments, and
social interactions through markets. This definition formalizes the quotation from Marshall. This
formalization is a more appropriate framework for economic causal analysis than other frameworks
developed in statistics that do not recognize constraints, preferences, and social interactions (i.e.
are not based on formal behavioral models). The concept of identification of a causal parameter
is discussed using the market demand-supply example that motivated thinking about the iden-
tification problem through the first half of the twentieth century. This example emphasizes the
consequences of interdependence among economic agents, but has some special features that are
not essential for understanding the fundamental nature of the identification problem. A more
general statement of the identification problem is given than appears in the published literature.
The role of causal parameters in policy analysis is clarified.
(2) The paper then assesses the response in the larger economics community to the Cowles
Commission research program. The Cowles group developed the linear equation simultaneous
equations model (SENT) that is still presented in most econometrics textbooks. It extensively ana-
lyzed one form of the identification problem that most economists still think of as the identification
problem. It focused attention on estimation of Keynesian macro models and on the parameters
of market-level supply and demand curves. By the mid-1960s, the Cowles research program was
widely perceived to be an intellectual success but an empirical failure.
This led to two radically different responses. The first was the VAR or "innovation accounting"
program most often associated with the work of Sims (1972, 1980, 1986)that objected to the
"incredible" nature of the identifying assumptions used in the Cowles Commission models and
advocated application of more loosely specified econometric models based on developments in the
multivariate time series literature. This research program systematically incorporated time series
methods into macroeconometrics and produced more accurate descriptions of macro data than did
its Cowles predecessors. Its use of economic theory was less explicit but it drew on the dynamic
economic models developed in the 70s and 80s to motivate its statistical decompositions.
3At about the same time, and more explicitly motivated by the development of a macroeco-
nomics based on dynamic general equilibrium theory under uncertainty, structural equations meth-
ods based on explicit parameterization of preferences and technology replaced the Cowles paradigm
for market aggregates and for Keynesian general equilibrium systems. The notion of a structural or
causal parameter survived but it was defined more precisely in terms of preference and technology
parameters and new methods for recovering them were proposed. Nonlinear dynamic econometric
models were developed to incorporate the insights of newly developed economic theory into frame-
works for economic measurement and to incorporate rational expectations into the formulation
and estimation of models. This approach emphasizes the clarity with which identifying assump-
tions are postulated and advocates an approach to estimation that tests and rejects well-posed
models. It is ambitious to attempt to identify and estimate economically interpretable "policy
invariant" structural parameters that can be used to ascertain the impacts of a variety of policies.
The empirical track record of the structural approach is, at best, mixed. Economic data, both
micro and macro, have not yielded many stable structural parameters. Parameter estimates from
the structural research program are widely held not to be credible. The empirical research program
of estimating policy invariant structural parameters in the presence of policy shifts remains to
be implemented. The perceived empirical failures of well-posed structural models have often
led to calls for abandonment of the structural approach in many applied fields, and not to the
development of better structural models in those fields.
Part of the continuing popularity of the VAR program is that it sticks more closely to the
data and in that sense is more empirically successful than structuralist approaches. At the same
time, its critics argue that it is difficult to interpret the estimates obtained from application of
this program within the context of well-specified economic models and that the Cowles vision of
using economics to evaluate economic policy and interpret phenomena has been lost. In addition,
the data summaries reported by VAR econometricians are not transparent and the choice of an
appropriate data summary requires knowledge of multivariate time series methods. Hence, the
time series data summaries often have a black-box quality about them and judgements about fit
are often mysterious to outsiders.
The tension between the goal of producing accurate descriptions of the data and the goal of
4producing counterfactual causal analyses for interpretation and policy prediction is a lasting legacy
of the research of the Cowles Commission, and a major theme of this essay. It nught be said that
the theoretical reach of the Cowles analysts exceeded their empirical grasp. They developed a
vision of empirical economics that has been hard to realize in practice.
Three very different responses to the perceived lack of empirical success of the structural
research program and the lack of economic interpretability and apparent arbitrariness in the choice
of VAR models emerged in the 1980s. All stress the need for greater transparency in generating
estimates, although there is disagreement over what transparency means. At the risk of gross
over-simplification, these responses can be classified in the following way. The first response is the
calibration movement, which responds to the perceived inability of formal structural econometric
methods to recover the parameters of economic models from time-series data and the perceived
overemphasis on statistics to the exclusion of economics in the application of VAR models. This
economic-theory-driven movement stresses the role of simple general equilibrium models with
parameters determined by introspection, simple dynamic time-series averages, or by appeal to
micro estimates. Calibrators emphasize the fragility of macro data and willingly embrace the
conditional nature of causal knowledge. They explicitly reject "fit" as a primary goal of empirical
economic models and emphasize interpretability over fIt.
The calibrators have been accused of being too casual in their use of evidence. Sample averages
from trended time series are used to determine parameters and when tested, the time series fits
of the calibrated models are often poor. The microestimates that are sometimes used in this
literature are often taken out of the contexts that justify them.
The second response is the nonparametric research program in econometrics and the earlier
"sensitivity analysis" research in statistics that views the functional forms and distributional
assumptions maintained in conventional structural (and nonstructural) approaches as a major
source of their lack of credibility and seeks to identify the parameters of economicmodels non-
parametrically or to examine the sensitivity of estimates to different identifying assumptions. The
nonparametric identification analyses conducted within this research program clarify the roleof
functional forms and distributional assumptions in identifying causal parameters. Using hypothet-
ical infinite samples, it separates out what can in principle be identified without functional form
5and distributional assumptions from what cannot. Many question the practical empirical relevance
of nonparametric theory in the limited sample sizes available to most economists. Others ques-
tion the novelty of the approach. Some form of bounding or sensitivity analysis has always been
practiced by most careful empirical economists. Sensitivity analysis is a cornerstone of calibration
econometrics.
A third, more empirical, approach to causal analysis has also emerged under the general rubric
of the "natural experiment" movement. This popular movement searches for credible sources of
identifying information for causal parameters, using ideal random experiments as a benchmark. It
rejects the use of structural econometric models because, according to its adherents, such models
do not produce credible estimates and impose arbitrary structure onto the data. In addition,
the severe computational costs of estimating most structural models make the simpler estimation
methods advocated by this group more appealing because findings can be easily replicated. The
economic theory used to interpret data is typically kept at an intuitive level.
In many respects, this group has much in common with advocates of the VAR approach. Both
approaches are strongly empirically grounded. However, natural experimenters prefer simpler data
summaries than those produced from modern time-series models. One goal, shared in common
with the nonparametric econometriciaus and the statisticians who advocate sensitivity analysis,
is to carefully locate what is "in the data" before any elaborate models are built or econometric
identification assumptions are invoked.
In this literature, the "causal parameters" are often defined relative to an instrumental variable
defined by some "natural experiment" or, in the best case scenario, by a social experiment. The
distinction between variables that affect causes and variables that affect causal relatiouships is
sometimes blurred. Accordingly, in this literature the definition of a causal parameter is not
always clearly stated, and formal statements of identifying conditions in terms of well-specified
economic models are rarely presented. Moreover, the absence of explicit structural frameworks
makes it difficult to cumulate knowledge across studies conducted within this framework. Many
studies produced by this research program have a "stand alone" feature and neither inform nor are
influenced by the general body of empirical knowledge in economics. This literature emphasizes
the role of causal models for interpreting data and analyzing existing policies, not for making the
6counterfactual policy predictions that motivated the research program of the Cowles Commission.
That goal is viewed as impossible.
In order to make this paper accessible to a general audience, I discuss only the simplest models
and deliberately avoid elaborate formal arguments. This strategy risks the danger of gross over-
simplification of some very subtle points. It is hoped that the points made using simple models
capture the essential features of the important contribution of econometrics to the understanding
of causality, identification and policy analysis.
2. Causal Parameters, Identification, and Econometric Policy Evaluation
A major contribution of twentieth century econometrics was the recognition that causality and
causal parameters are most fruitfully defined within formal economic models and that comparative
statics variations within these models formalize the intuition in Marshall's quotation and most
clearly define causal parameters. A second major contribution was the formalization of the insight
developed in philosophy that many models are consistent with the same data and that restrictions
must be the placed on models to use the data to recover causal parameters. A third major
contribution was the clarification of the role of causal models in policy evaluation.
2.1 Causal Parameters
Within the context of an economic model, the concept of a causal parameter is well defined.
For example, in a model of production of output Y based on inputs X that can be independently
varied, we write the function F: RN R' as
(1)Y=F(Xl,...,XN)
where X =(X1XN) is a vector of inputs defined over domain D (X E D). They play the roles of
the causes, i.e. factors that produce Y.6 These causes are the primitives of the relevant economic
theory. Assuming that each input can be freely varied, so there are no functional restrictions
connecting the components of X, the change in Y produced from the variation in X holding all
other inputs constant is the causal effect of X. If F is differentiable inthe marginal causal
6 wouldno doubt claim that I am begging the question of defining a causal parameter by assuming
the existence of economic models like (1). My point is that given such models, discussions of causality become trivial.
The whole goal of economic theory is to produce models like (1) and I take these as primitives. The multiplicity
of possible models for the same phenomenon is the reason why a multiplicity of possible causal relationships may
exist for the same phenomenon.
7effect of X1 is
(2) =(X1,X1,...,X)Ix=.
IfF is not differentiable, finite changes replace derivatives. Nothing in this definition requires
that any or all of the X be observed. Moreover, the X may be stochastic. Agents may make
decisions about subsets of the X based only on expectations about the remaining X. In this case.
realized X components enter (1) and we define the causal parameter in an ex post sense.7 A variety
of causal mechanisms can be contemplated even in this simple setting, because variations in the
prices of inputs and outputs can cause X to vary. All of the parametric variations entertained in
the microeconomic theory of the firm are possible sources of causal variation.
The assumption that the components of X can be varied independently is strong but essential to
the definition of a causal parameter. The admissible variation may be local or global.S Restrictions
on the admissible variation of the variables affect the interpretation of causal effects. For example,
in a Leontief, or fixed-coefficient production model it is necessary to vary all inputs to get an effect
from any. Thus an increase in X1 is necessary to increase Y but is not sufficient.9 More generally,
social and economic constraints operating on a firm may restrict the range of admissible variations
so that a ceteris po.ribus change in one coordinate of X is not possible. Entire classes of variations
for different restrictions on domain D can be defined but in general these are distinct from the
ccteriis pan bus variations used to define a causal law.'° The domain D is sometimes just one point
as a consequence of the properties of a model, as I demonstrate below.
Model (1) with no restrictions among the X defines a model of potential outcomes. This can
be linked to models of causal effects based on potential outcomes presented in the "treatment
effect" literature by choosing the X values to correspond to different treatments.11 When (1) is
TFrom Billingsley (1986), we know that if Y is a random variable, and X is a vector of random variables, then
Y is measureable with respect to X if and only if Y =F(X).Thus if we claim that an outcome is "explained" by
X in this sense, then a causal relationship like (1) is automatically produced. -
A formal definition of global variation independence is that the domain of D is the Cartesian product X1 x
X2 x X3, ...,xX where X is the domain of X and there is no restriction across the values of the X. When the
X cross terms satisfy this restriction they are termed "variation free". The local version imposes this requirement
only in neighborhoods.
9This corresponds to the concept of the "conjuncts of causality". See Marini and Singer (1988).
100ne can define many different restricted "effects" depending on the rettrictions imposed on D.
11The most direct way is to define X1 as a treatment indicator and to define=F11(X2, as the
8separable in X, we can write it as
Y =
andthe causal effect of X3 can be defined independently of the level of the other values of X. Such
separability is especially convenient if some of the X1 are not observed, because it avoids the need
to define causal parameters in terms of unobserved levels of factors. For this reason, separable
econometric models are widely used, and were the exclusive focus of the Cowles Commission
analysts.
A major advance in thinking about causal parameters came when early econometric analysts
recognized the possibility that Y and some or all of the components of X could be jointly de-
termined or interrelated. This imposed severe restrictions on the causal parameters that can be
defined in such models because it restricts the possibilities of variation in the causes. Controlled
variation is the key idea in defining a causal parameter. The paradigm for this analysis was a
model of market demand and supply:
(3) QD= QD(PD z', UD) Demand
(4) QS= Q8(P8,Z8, Us) Supply
where QD and Q5arevectors of goods demanded and supplied at prices p' and P5 respectively.
(Throughout much of this paper, little is lost expositionally in thinking of the QandP as scalars.)
ZD, Z5, UD and U8 are shifters of market demand and supply equations (i. e. determinants
of demand and supply). They are determined outside of the markets where the P and Qare
determined and are called external variables.12 The P and Qarecalled internal variables. They
potential outcome for treatment X1 =x1.Thus the models of potential outcomes of Neyman (1935), Fisher
(1935), Cox (1959) and Rubin (1978) are versions of the econometric causal model. Galles and Pearl (1998)
establish the formal equivalence of these two frameworks. Pearl (1998) presents a synthesis of these two approaches
using directed acyclic graph theory. Thus the contrast between "structural" and "causal" models that is sometimes
made is a false one. Imbens and Angrist (1994) present a precise formulation of the Rubin model. The statistical
models ignore the constraints across potential outcomes induced by social interactions and by resource constraints
i.e. the potential restrictions on D.
'2Theterm external variable appears to originate in Wright (1934). Frisch (1933) wrote about autonomous
relationships. Given the numerous conflicting definitions of "exogenous" and "endogenous" variables documented
by Leamer (1985), the "internal-external" distinction is a useful one for focusing on what is determined in a model
and what is specified outside of it.
9may include distributions of the characteristics of consumers and producers. The U are causes not
observed by the analyst; the Z are observed. In this section of the paper, there is no distinction
between Z and U. This distinction is traditional, and useful in later sections so I make it here.
In Marshall's model of industry equilibrium, (3) is the demand for a good by a representative
consumer while (4) is the supply function of the representative price-taking firm that maximizes
profit given production technology (1) and factor prices. Assume that QD and Q8aresingle-
valued functions. If an equilibrium exists, Q= = Q5 andP =pD=p5If (P, Q)isuniquely
determined as a function of the Z and U, the model is said to be "complete".13
The meaning of a causal parameter in (3) and (4) is the same as in the analysis of equation (1).
If prices are fixed outside of the market, say by a government pricing program, we can hypothetically
vary pD and P3 to obtain causal effects for (3) and (4) as partial derivatives or as finite differences
of prices holding other factors constant.11 As in the analysis of the production function, the
definition of a causal parameter does not require any statement about what is actually observed
or what can be identified from data. As before, the definition of a causal parameter only requires
a hypothetical model and the assumption that prices can be varied within the rules specified by
the model. A statistical justification of (3) and (4) interprets (3) as the conditional expectation
of QD given pD, ZD and UD, and interprets (4) as the conditional expectation of Q5givenP5,
Z3. U5.'5 Since we condition on all causes, these conditional expectations are just deterministic
functional relationships. The effect of P' on Q°holdingZ' and UD constant is different from the
effect of pD on QD not holding UD constant, that is E(QD pD ZD, UD) $E(QDpD ZD). In
the early investigations of causal models, and most models in current use, linear equation versions
of (3) and (4) were used, so causal parameters could be defined independently of the levels of the
causal variables.
As a matter of model specification, we might require that candidate causal functions obey
certain restrictions. We might require that (3) and (4) have at least one solution P =pD=p5
13Koopmans and Hood (1953).
'4Both (3) and (4) have well defined interpretations for their inverse functions. Thus in (3), pD is the competitive
price that would emerge if quantity QD were dumped on the market. In (4) ps is the minimum price that
competitive firms would accept to produce an externally specified Q5.
15The justification for this is given in footnote 7.
toand Q= QD= sothere is at least one market equilibrium. Other restrictions like positivity
3Q5 ___ of(the diagonals of) (supply increasing in price) or negativity of (the diagonals of)3pD
(downward sloping demand) might be imposed.
In the analysis of equations (3) and (4), one special case plays a central role. It is the model
that equates demand and supply In the important special case when prices and quantities are
assumed to obey an equilibrium relationship, there is no meaning attached to a "causal" effect of a
price change because the model restricts the domain (D) of P and Qtoa single value if equilibrium
is unique. Price and quantity are internal (or endogenous) variables jointly determined by the ZD,
Z5, U5 and UD. External (or exogenous)variables(ZD, ZS,UD, U) determine (P, Q)butare not
determined by them.
Holding everything else fixed in equilibrium (all other determinants of demand and supply),
the prices and quantities are fixed. Thus, in equilibrium, the price of good jcannotbe changed
unless the exogenous or forcing variables, ZD, Zs, U5, UD, are changed. More formally under
completeness, we can obtain the reduced forms:
5(a)P =P(Z',Z5, UD, U)
5(b)Q= Q(ZD,Z5, UD, U5).
The concept of an externally-specified variable is a model-specific notion. It entails specification
of 5(a) and 5(b) as causal relationships in the sense of (1) to replace (3) and (4) when QD =QS
and H° =P5.In a fully nonparametric setting, this requires that the variables on the right-hand
sides have no functional restrictiqns connecting them.16 It also entails the notion that within the
model, ZD and Z5 can be independently varied for each given value of U' and U5 (i.e. it is
possible to vary ZD and Z8 within the model holding UD and U5 fixed).17
Assuming that some components of ZD do not appear in Z5, that some components ofZs do
not appear in ZD, and that those components have a nonzero impact on price, one can use the
'51f functional forms (e.g. linearity) are maintained, some forms of dependence can be tolerated (e.g.nonlinear
relationships among the variables in a linear model).
'7Formally, the sapport of (ZD, Z5) is assumed to be the same for all values of (U', U). In this section, the Z'
and Z5 enter symmetrically with UD and U5 so we should also require that the support of (UD, U5) is assumed
to be the same for all values of (ZD, Z5) or, more generally, we might require that all variables be variationfree
in the sense of footnote 8.
11variation in the excluded variables to vary the p' or P5 in equations (3) and (4) while holding the
other arguments of those equations fixed. With this variation, one can define the causal parameters
of the effect of P' on andthe effect of P8 on QS. Assuming differentiable functions, and










Under these conditions, we can recover the price derivatives of (3) and (4) even though an equilib-
rium restriction connects pD =P8.The crucial notion in defining the causal parameter for price
variation, when the market outcomes are characterized by an equilibrium relationship, is variation
in external variables that affect canses (the P' and P8, respectively, in these examples) but that
do not affect causal relationships (i.e. that are excluded from the relationship in question)!9 If an
external variable is excluded from the causal relationship so it does not directly affect the causal
relationship, the causal law is said to be invariant with respect to variations in that external vari-
able. If the variable in question is a policy variable, the causal relationship is said to be "policy
invariant."
'8Proof: Differentiate (3) with respect to Z! to obtain
— 3pD
— OpD3z8
Usingequilibrium values (PD =P8=P)substitute from 5(a) to obtain = andfrom 5(b) to
3Q13 DQ .OP 3QD(oQ\/(OP obtarn-- = Assuming 0, we obtain =/
If there are several Ze variables
that satisfy the stated conditions, each defines the same causal parameter.
iUTlie definition of a causal parameter crucially depends on independent variation. In the equilibrium setting
under consideration, without an exclusion restriction, the equilibrium quantities cannot be independently varied.
Thus no independent variation is possible. However, if we consider a disequilibrium setting, where prices (or
quantities) are set externally, say through government policy or a social experiment, then the causal parameter can
be defined, as before.
12Variations in the included Z variables have direct effects (holding all other variables in (3) or
(4) constant) and indirect effects (through their effects on the endogenous variables via 5(a) and
5(b)). The direct effects of Z can be computed by compensating for changes in the P induced by
the changes in the included components of Z by varying the excluded components of Z. These
direct and indirect effects play a crucial role in path analysis developed by Wright (1934) and
widely used in sociology. (See Blalock, 1964).20 The direct causal effects are called structural.
Both direct and indirect effects are causal, and are defined by well-specified variations.21
As a consequence of the potentially interdependent nature of some causes, a new terminology
was created. Structural causal effects are defined as the direct effects of the variables in the
behavioral equations. Thus the partial derivatives of (3) and (4) are termed structural effects.
When these equations are linear, the coefficients on the causal variables are called structural
parameters and they fully characterize the structural effects. In more general nonlinear models,
the derivatives of the structural (or behavioral) equation no longer fully characterize the structural
relationship. The parameters required to fully characterize the structural relationship are termed
structural parameters. A major difference between the Cowles group, which worked exclusively
with linear equations, and later analysts working with explicitly parameterized economic models,
is in the definition of a structural parameter and the separation between the concept of a structural
effect from the concept of a structural parameter.22
Both structural equations and reduced form equations can be used to generate causal parame-
ters. They differ in what is held constant in the sense of Marshall. Reduced form relationships
can be defined without the exclusion restrictions required to define structural relationships.
Functional relationships among variables that are invariant to variations in external variables
are central to the definition and identification of causal laws in the case when some variables
20Path analysis estimates the direct effect of structural variables and the direct effects of external variables as
well as their indirect effects operating through structural variables. The "total effect" of an external variable is the
sum of the direct effect and the indirect effects operating through all of the endogenous variables in a relationship.
21this section, there is no distinction between the Z and the U, and the variations discussed in the text can be
defined using any excluded or included variables, observed or unobserved. I use the observed-unobserved notation
only because it is more familiar and will play a role in the next subsection.
22The term "deep structural parameter" was introduced in the 1970s to distinguish between the derivatives of a
behavioral relationship used to define causal effects and the parameters that generate the behavioral relationship.
13of a system of equations are interdependent. The notion of invariant relationships motivated
the Cowles Commission definition of a structural equation. It also motivated the econometric
estimation method of instrumental variables using empirical counterparts to the hypothetical
relationships.
These notions all have counterparts in dynamic settings, where the variables are time-dated.
Time-series notions of causality as developed by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972), are conceptually
distinct and sometimes at odds with the notion of causality based on controlled variation that is
presented in this paper and at the heart of the quotation from Marshall presented in the introduc-
tion. The time-series literature on causality uses time dating of variables (temporal precedence
relationships) to determine empirical causes and does not define or establish ceteris paribus rela-
tionships. Thus letting t denote time, past Y is said to cause future X, if past 1helpspredict
future X given past X using some statistical goodness-of-fit criterion. Such causality can arise
if future X determines pastas often arises in dynamic economic models.23 The "causality"
determined from such testing procedures does not correspond to causality as defined in this paper,
and in this instance is in direct conflict with it.
The limited role of the time-series tests for causality within articulated causal dynamic models
is discussed by Hansen and Sargent (1980). The dynamic structural models derived from economic
theory of the sort analyzed by Hansen and Sargent provide the framework for defining causality
as used in this paper and for conducting counterfactual policy analysis. I do not exposit these
models only because of my self-imposed limitation on the technical level of this paper.
2.2 Identification: Determining Causal Models From Data
The formalization of models, the definition of causal and structural laws, and the notion of
structural laws that are invariant with respect to variation in excluded external variables were
important contributions of economics. Even more important was the clarification of the limits
of empirical knowledge.24 An identification problem arises because many alternative structural
231n a perfect foresight model like that of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), future prices determine current invest-
ment. Time-series causality tests would reveal that investment "causes" future prices which is precisely the wrong
conclusion for the concept of causality used in this paper. Hamilton (1994, pp. 306-309) presents an example in
which Granger causality is in opposition to the causal interpretation in the sense of this paper and another example
in wInch Granger causality is in accord with the definition of causality used in this paper.
24Other fields independently developed their own analyses of the identification problem in more specialized
14models are consistent with the same data, unless restrictions are imposed. Empirical knowledge
about structural models is contingent on these restrictions.
The first studies of this problem were in the context of the supply-demand model of equations
(3) and (4), assuming equilibrium (PS =pDand Q5= QD).This case is still featured in
econometrics textbooks. The identification problem is particularly stark in this setting if there
are noor Z3 variables, and if the UD and U5 are set to zero, so there is no problem of the
unobservables UD or U8 being correlated with P or Q.25Inthis case, two equations, (3) and (4),
relating QtoP coexist. (The demand curve and the supply curve respectively). They contain
the same variables. Empirically, there is no way to determine either relationship from the joint
distribution of QandP unless extra information (restrictions on models) is available.20
Although the identification problem was first systematically explored in this context, it is a
much more general problem and it is useful to consider it more generally.27 In its essence, it
considers what particular models within a broader class of models are consistent with a given set
of data or facts. More specifically, consider a model space M which is the class of all models
that are considered as worthy of consideration. Elements iii E M are possible theoretical models.
There are two attributes of a model, corresponding to what one can observe about the model in a
given set of data and what one would like to know about the model. Define functions g M —pT
and h M —+Swhere T and S are spaces chosen so that g(M) =Tand h(M) =S.S is the
source or data space and T is the target space. For any specific model in E M, h(rn) =sE S
represents those characteristics of the model that can be observed in the available data. The
map g(m) =tE T applied to the model gives the characteristics of a model that we would like
to identify. Some parameters may be of interest while others are not, and models may only be
partially identified. Only if one is interested in determining the entire model would T =Mand
then g would be an identity map.
Many models in may be consistent with the same source space, so h is not one to one. In
this abstract setting, the identification problem is to determine whether elements in T can be
settings. (Kooprnans and Reirsol, 1950).
25ldentification problems can arise even if there are no error terms in the model.
26Morgan (1990) discusses early attempts to solve this problem using ad hoc statistical conventions.
27This framework is based on my interpretation of Barros (1988).
15uniquely determined from elements in S. Elements in T and S are related by the correspondence
f g o h'. The identification problem arises because for some s E 5, f(s) may have more than
one element in T. In that case more than one interpretation of the same evidence is available. If
we limit attention to T via g, rather than M, f is more likely to map points of S into points of
M. The goal of identification analysis is to find restrictions, R, to modify f to fR so that fR(5)
has at most one element in T, i.e. so that only one story is possible given the data.
In the usual form of the identification problem, restrictions are imposed on the admissible
models in M so R cM.For each s eSdefine fR(s) =g(h'(s)fl R). If R is chosen so that
for all s E 5, fR(5) has at most one element in T, R forms a set of identifying restrictions. Thus
R cMidentifies g from h when for any s E s,f R(5) =g(h'(s)fl R) contains at most one
element in T.28 If R is too restrictive, for some values of s, f R(5) =0,the empty set, so R may
be incompatible with some s, i.e. some features of the model augmented by R are inconsistent
with some data. In this case, R forms a set of over-identifying restrictions. Otherwise, if fR(s)
contains exactly one element in T for each s E 5, R forms a set of just-identifying restrictions.29
For a given set of data, it will usually be necessary to restrict the model via R to produce
unique identification. Alternatively, enlarging the data (expanding the source space 5) may also
produce identification. Enlarging S may entail larger samples of the same distributions of charac-
teristics or expanding the data to include more variables.30 In the classical linear-in-parameters,
simultaneous-equations model, exclusion restrictions are used to define R. The source space is the
joint distribution of (P, Q) given (Z', Z8). Under normality, all of the information in the source
space is contained in the means and covariances of the data.
In the supply-demand example, the model space M consists of all admissible models for supply
and demand, and the target space T could be the price elasticities of supply and demand. Even
2In principle, restrictions can also be placed on T but these restrictions are often less easy to interpret. In the
context of a demand function, T could include both the price and income elasticities, and we might restrict the
income elasticity to be known.
29Note that fR(5) =0if h1(s) fl R =0since we assume g(m) 0 for all in EM.Thus a set of identifying
restrictions forms a set of just-identifying restrictions if h(R) =S.
modern analyses of identification assume that sample sizes are infinite so that enlarging the sample size
is not informative. However, in any applied problem this distinction is not helpful. Having a small sample (e.g.
fewer observations than regressors) can produce an identification problem.
16when u' =Us=0,the model of equations (3) and (4) is not identified if ZD =Z5.As first
noted by Tinbergen (1930, reprinted 1995), if z' and Z5 each contain variables not in the other,
but that determine P and Qvia5(a) and 5(b), the model is identified. In this deterministic
setting, the variation in P induced by the external variables in Z that are not in the equation
being analyzed substitutes for variation in P that would occur if market equilibrium conditions
did not govern the data. If there are unobservables in the model, their effects on Z must be
controlled to use this variation. Conventional statistical assumptions made to effect such control
are that (UD, Us) are statistically independent or mean independent of (7°, Z5).3'
One sample counterpart to this identification argument is the method of instrumental vari-
ables.32 Variation in the excluded Z induces variation in the P. This variation is essential
whether or not there are error terms in the model. Many different estimation methods can be
used to induce the required variation in the data. An instrument -definedas a source of variation
-neednot necessarily be used as an instrumental variable to empirically identify causal parame-
ters. Social experiments that do not alter the structural relationship being studied can induce
the required variation.33 The method of generalized residuals or control functions that explicitly
models the dependence of the error term on the right-hand side variables can do so as well.34
A much richer class of restrictions R can also produce identification including restrictions on
covariances, restrictions on coefficients and restrictions on functional forms. (Fisher, 1966). In dy-
namic models, cross-equation restrictions produced from theory and restrictions on the time-series
processes of the unobservables provide additional sources of information. (Hansen and Sargent,
31Mean independence is the condition E(UD Z°,Z5)=0and E(.LJS I Z', Z5) =0.
32The method was independently developed by Philip Wright (1928) and Olav Reirsol (1945). Epstein (1987)
speculates that Sewall Wright, the famous geneticist, inventor of path analysis and son of Philip Wright, was the
likely inventor of this method. See also Morgan (1990) and the intellectual history reported in Goldberger (1972).
33Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) show that randomization is an instrumental variable.
34lnstead of purging the endogeneous variables of the errors, this method models the errors in terms of the
right-hand side endogeneous variables and all of the regressors. Ta a two-equation, simultaneous-equations system:
(*) Y1 =nY2+/3Z1+ U1 and 1'2 =-1Y1+ 6Z2 + U2 where E(U1,U2 Z1,Z2) =0,the method of control
functions forms E(U1 I "2,Z1,Z2, p), whereis some unknowa parameter vector and enters it as a conditioaing
functioa in (*): Y1 =nI'2+ flZ1 + E(Ui i'2, Z1, Z2, ) + (U1 —E(Ui1'2, Z1, Z2, v,)). With sufficient variation in
E(Ui IY2,Z1, Z2, ), which in the absence of parametric restrictions clearly requires variation in Z2, it is possible
to identify a, /3 and p. See Heckman and Robb (1986). Nonparametric versions of the method exist. The method
underlies an entire class of nonparametric selection bias estimators. See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
171980). Restrictions on the covariances of the innovations of vector-autoregressive models play a
crucial identifying role in VAR frameworks. (Sims, 1980).
Amajor lesson of the econometric literature on identification that is still not well understood
by many empirical economists is that just-identifying assumptions are untestable. Different restric-
tions R1, i =1I that secure just-identification produce I different stories about the parameters
in the target space T for the same element s in data source space S. Different admissible models
m produced by different R that are just-identifying are compatible with the same elements of
the source space 5, and all empirical knowledge is in S. Accordingly, no empirical test of just-
identifying restrictions is possible. The extra restrictions on the source space are testable. Tests
of identification reported in the empirical literature are always tests of over-identifying assump-
tions and they are based on maintained identifying assumptions although they are frequently and
confusingly referred to as tests of identifying conditions.35
Models that are not fully identified may contain subsets of parameters that can be identified.
As first noted by Wright (1934) and Marschak and Andrews (1944), models that are not identified
may still contain information on ranges of structural parameter values. This insight is a focus of
recent research which I discuss below.
2.3 Econometric Policy Evaluation: Marschak and the Lucas Critique
In the context of structural economic models, identification necessarily precedes testing of spe-
cific causal hypotheses. Thus if an effect cannot, in principle, be identified it is not possible to test
whether the effect is present in the data.36 Structural parameters have a clear economic interpre-
tation. Estimates of them can be used to test theories if identifying assumptions are maintained,
to interpret empirical relationships, to perform welfare analysis (e.g. compute consumer surplus)
and to improve the efficiency of estimates and forecasts if models are overidentified. They can also
be used as frameworks for empirical analyses that facilitate the accumulation of evidence across
different studies. These benefits are to be set against the costs of making identifying assumptions.
35Tests for endogeneity in simultaneous-equations models are always predicated on the existence of at least one
just-identifying exclusion restriction that is used as an instrument.
361f the causal effect is identified within a range of values that excludes the no-effect value, exact identification
of the causal effect is not required to test the null hypothesis of no-effect. One simply asks if the identified range
includes the value implied by null hypothesis.
18One benefit that motivated much of the early econometric literature, and one that still moti-
vates much econometric research, is the ability to use structural models to predict the consequences
and evaluate the effects of alternative economic policies. Formal econometrics was perfected by
economists greatly influenced by the Great Depression. Early pioneers like Tinbergen and Frisch
were policy activists who were optimistic about the ability of enlightened social planners to con-
trol the business cycle through the introduction of new policies based on empirically justified
econometric models.37
The clearest statement of the benefit of structural econometric models for social planning is
by Marschak (1953). Later work by Lucas (1976) builds on Marscha.k's analysis by updating it to
incorporate explicit models of intertemporal decision making under uncertainty.
The goals of econometric policy evaluation are to consider the impact of policy interventions
on the economy, to compute their consequences for economic welfare and to forecast the effect
of new policies never previously experienced. If a policy has previously been in place, and it is
possible to adjust outcome variables for changes in external circumstances unrelated to the policy
that also affect outcomes, econometric policy evaluation is just a table look-up exercise. Structural
parameters are not required to forecast the effects of the policy on outcomes although causal effects
may still be desired for interpretive purposes. It is enough to know the reduced forms 5(a) and
5(b). What happened before will happen again. If the same basic policy is proposed but levels of
policy parameters are different from what has been experienced in the past, some interpolation or
extrapolation of past relationships is required. A disciplined way to do this is to impose functional
forms on estimating equations.
The theory of econometric policy evaluation typically proceeds by assuming that policy para-
meters are external variables.38 Under this assumption, one can use reduced forms like 5(a) and
5(b) to forecast the effects of policies on outcomes, using historical relationships to predict the
future.
Marschak's case for knowing structural parameters was for their use in predicting the effects
37For an illuminating discussion of the work of Frisch and his committment to social planning, see 0. Bjerkholt
(1998), J. Chipman (1998), and the other papers in S. Strom (1998).
38Marschak noted, but did not develop, the notion that policies themselves might be internal or endogenous.
19of a new policy, never previously experienced. Such a problem is intrinsically difficult and of
the same character as the problem of forecasting the demand for a new good, never previously
consumed. Without the ability to project past experience into knowledge of the future, the problem
is intractable. The essence of this problem is succinctly summarized in a quotation from Knight:
"The existence of a problem in knowledge depends on the future being different from
the past, while the possibility of a solution of a problem of knowledge depends on the
future being like the past" (Knight, 1921, p. 813).
Marschak analyzed a class of policies that can be evaluated using structural equations. The
prototype was the analysis of the effect of a commodity tax never previously experienced on
equilibrium prices and quantities. Since there is no previous experience with the policy, the table
look-up method is not available to solve this problem.
Marschak operationalizes Knight's quotation by noting that in general a commodity tax
changes the price of the good. For a proportional tax, r, the after-tax price paid by a con-
sinner is P =P(1+ r) where P is the price received by producers. With structural equations in
hand, one can in principle accurately forecast the effect of a new tax on market aggregates using
structural equations (3) and (4) modified to incorporate the tax wedge. Simply insert the tax
wedge and solve the structural equations for the new equilibrium prices and quantities.
Under the conditions sketched in Section 2.2, it is possible to use external variation in excluded
variables in the pre-policy period to identify these equations from equilibrium observations. A
potentially serious problem is that the functions (3) and (4) may be nonlinear, and the range of
historical price variation may not be sufficient to trace out those functions over the range of values
that are relevant in the new policy regime. Marschak avoids this problem by assuming linear
structural equations. In his case, a finite set of data points determine these equations over their
entire domain of definition. A fully nonparametric approach would require sufficient variation in
P in the pre-tax sample used to fit the structural equations to encompass the relevant support of
P in the period of the policy.
By estimating the structural parameters in the pre-policy period and by linking the policy vari-
ation to price variation, Marschak solves the problem of forecasting the effect of a new tax policy
on market aggregates. It is important to note that both of his steps are necessary. Knowledge of
20structural parameters is uot enough. It is also necessary to somehow link the variation that will
be induced by the new policy to some variation within the model in the pre-policy sample period
so "the future will be like the past." In Marschak's example, tax and price variation are on the
same footing.
If this link cannot be made, the problem of forecasting the impact of a new policy cannot
be solved using an econometric model. Consider a policy that injects random taxation into the
deterministic environment considered by Marschak. If the uncertainty induced by the policy is of
a fundamentally different character than anything previously experienced, an empirically based
solution to the policy forecasting problem is intractable.39
In his seminal article, Marschak made another important point. Different criteria for evaluating
a policy require different parameters. (Different policies require knowledge of different target spaces
T). Given an assumption that describes a proposed policy in terms of variation experienced in a
pre-policy period, the answers to different economic decision problems require different structural
parameters or combinations of structural parameters. It may not be necessary to determine the
full structure to answer a particular policy evaluation question. Thus if we seek to determine the
effect of an externally determined price change on consumer welfare, it is only necessary to identify
the demand curve, a weaker requirement than full system identification. Marschak presents an
extensive discussion of decision problems requiring different amounts of structural information
including some where only ratios of some of the structural parameters are required.
A quarter of a century later, Lucas (1976) returned to the policy evaluation problem addressed
by Marschak. Among other contributions, Lucas updated Marschak's analysis to incorporate
explicit models of decision making under uncertainty and to incorporate endogenous expectations.
Lucas criticized the practice of econometric policy evaluation in the late 1960s and early 1970s
because it was careless in modelling the expectations of agents and did not account for the effects
39The parallel problem of estimating the demand for a new good entails the same difficulties. Lancaster (1971)
solves the problem by assuming that new goods are rebundlings of the same characteristics as in the old goods
and proposes estimation of the demand for characteristics and distributions of population preference parameters
to generate forecasts. Quandt (1970) and Domencich and McFadden (1975) use similar schemes in the analysis of
discrete choice to forecast the demand for new goods. In Domencich and McFadden, unobserved attributes of new
goods are assumed to be independent realizations of unobserved attributes for old goods.
21of policy changes on the expectations of the agents abont future shocks. He noted that different
stochastic processes for external forcing variables produced by different economic policies would
in general induce different behavioral responses and that an adequate model of policy forecasting
should account for this.
Econometric models that ignore expectations are misspecified or "incomplete" in the precise
sense of the Cowles economists. A missing internal or endogenous variable would make an es-
timated misspecified "structure" appear to be empirically unstable when the distribution of the
forcing variables was changed, say by changes induced by new economic policies.
Lucas claimed that this type of model misspeciflcation accounted for the parameter drift ob-
served in many empirical macro models although the empirical evidence for his claim is controver-
sial.4° The source of the parameter instability is model misspecification due to omitted endogenons
expectations variables and any omitted external forcing variables associated with the equation de-
termining expectations.4' Thus estimates of misspecified structural equations will appear to be
non-invariant in response to changes in the distributions of the forcing variables. Such changes
may come from changes in policies but this is only one possible sourceof change in the forcing
variables.42
To recast the Lucas critique in the language of a classical linear simultaneous equations model,
write
(6)FY+BX=U
where Y is a vector of endogenous variables and X is a vector of exogenous or external forcing
variables, and U is a vector of unobserved forcing variables. If F has an inverse, the system is said
to be complete and a reduced form Y as a function of X is well defined. As noted by Hansen and
Sargent (1980), modern dynamic theory in general requires nonlinear models with cross-equation
restrictions and lagged (and sometimes future) values of Y, X and U, so (6) is too simple to capture
40See the evidence in Fair (1994). The evidence that policy shifts affect the parameters of fitted macro models is
at best mixed. However, the supply shocks of the 1970s definitely affected the stability of fitted macrorelationships.
41As demonstrated e.g. by White (1987), estimated misspecified models will appear to exhibit parameter insta-
bility if the distributions of the external forcing variables change over the sample period.
12Lucas compares two steady states -onebefore the policy change and one after -anddoes not analyze the
short-run responses to the regime shift that are required for explaining the time-series data accompanying a regime
shift.
22the class of dynamic structnral models discussed by Lucas.
However, it is useful to make Lncas' point in this framework if only to make an analogy. To
do so, partition Y =(Y1,Y2) into two components corresponding to the included and omitted
endogenous variables. Think of Y2 as the expectations variables determined by the model under
rational expectations. Then partition F =( " f ) , B=( ' ) , x = ( ' ) , and
u= ( ' ) conformably.Assuming F11 has an inverse
=—Fjj'F12Y2
—Fjj'B1X1+ Fjj'U1.43
By omitting Y2 and any determinants of Y2, the misspecified model for Y1 will exhibit within-
sample instability if the distribution of the forcing variables changes in different sample periods.
These changes could arise because of policy interventions or because of external shocks to the
economy unrelated to policy interventions. If changes in the forcing variables are modeled along
with the unobserved expectations of the model, there should be no drift in estimated parameters.
Marschak established that structural models are only a necessary ingredient for evaluating
a new policy. Even if correctly specified structural equations are estimated, econometric policy
evaluation will be ineffective in evaluating new policies that involve variation in variables that
previously did not vary and that cannot be linked to variables in the model that have varied.
The problems of forecasting the effects of a new policy are profound and many would argue they
are impossibly hard. Inadvertently, the Cowles group fashioned a powerful argument against the
possibilities of empirically based social planning -amajor goal of the early econometricians.
3. The Cowles Research Program as A Guide to Empirical Research
and Responses To Its Perceived Limitations
By the mid-1950s, the Cowles research program defined mainstream theoretical econometrics.
It was widely recognized that it needed to be augmented to include a richer array of dynamic
models and to account for serial correlation in aggregate time series. Granger and Newbold
43Wallis (1980) presents a systematic analysis of the formulation and estimation of the rational expectations
models within a linear in-parameters Cowles-like model augmented to account for serial correlation in the equation
errors. He does not, however, develop the consequences of model misspecification that are discussed in this paper.
23(1977) and Zeliner and Palm (1974). aniong others, made important extensions of the Cowles
Commission framework to time-series settings integrating the work of Frisch (1933) and Slutsky
(1937) on propagation mechanisms and the dynamic stochastic theory of Mann and Wald (1943)
and Phillips (1966) into the Cowles Commission framework.
The sources of identification for the macro models were controversial. In an influential paper.
T.C. Liu (1960) argued that the exclusion restrictions used in the Cowles models were artificial,
that economic theory would require the inclusion of many more variables than those found in the
existing models of the day, and that structural models were fundamentally underidentified. He
carefully scrutinized the ad hoc nature of identification in the influential Klein-Goldberger model
(1955). In his view, the quest for structural estimation was quixotic, and hence the goal of estimat-
ing the impact of a new policy was an impossible dream. He advocated the use of reduced-form
equations for making economic forecasts. As subsequent generations of macro models based on
the Cowles program became larger, the criticism of them became more intense. Their compu-
tational complexity and fragile identification attracted unfavorable discussion that elaborated on
the negative commentary of Liu. (See the discussion in Brunner, 1972).
At the same time, as documented by Epstein (1987) and Morgan (1990), the Cowles mod-
els were perceived to be empirical failures. Estimated parameter instability and the practice of
refitting empirical macro models over short time periods indicated that the official rhetoric of
econometrics was not followed in practice. Naive forecasting models often did better than fully
articulated structural models estimated under the Cowles paradigm. This evidence motivated the
"Lucas critique" as one possible explanation for the observed parameter instability.
Although the Cowles Commission was successful in pressing the potential importance of en-
dogeneity bias (the feedback between the U and the Y in equation (6)), the empirical importance
of this problem compared to the other problems in estimating macro models was never clearly es-
tablished. Indeed Basmann (1974), one inventor of the method of two-stage least squares, claimed
that endogeneity bias was of second-order importance compared to the basic measurement error in
the macrodata. In his invited lecture at the 1970 World Congress of the Econometric Society, he
plotted measurement error boxes around the least squares and endogeneity -correctedestimates
of the consumption function from an influential article by Haavelmo (1947). The slight change in
24the OLS fitted line that arose from correcting for simultaneity bias was dwarfed by the intrinsic
variation in the data due to measurement error.14 Simultaneity bias was a second-order problem
in Haavelmo's data, although it was the focal point of Cowles econometrics.45
Two radically different responses emerged to the perceived failure of the Cowles research pro-
gram. One response was the development of more explicitly parameterized structural economic
models. The other response, developed by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972, 1980, 1986), was based
on systematic application of vector autoregression time-series methods that had been fully devel-
oped after the basic Cowles program had been completed but which originated in the work of
Mann and Wald (1943). The vector autoregression approach (VAR) econometrically implemented
Frisch's vision (1933) of dynamic propagation mechanisms for business cycle research.
A rough characterization of the two responses is that structuralists adhered to and refined the
theory often at the expense of obtaining good fits to the data. VAR econometricians stuck to the
data as summarized by vector autoregressions and used economic theory as an informal guide for
interpreting statistical decompositions. Covariance restrictions on time-series processes replaced
the a priorirestrictionson behavioral equations invoked by the Cowles Commission. Innovation
accounting replaced causal analysis.
Structuralists adopted a deductive, theory-oriented approach, that estimated structural models
with testable implications that were frequently rejected in the data. The rejections were to be used
as a basis for improvements in the models following the methodology of Popper (1959), discussed
below in Section 4. Interpretability, counterfactual policy evaluation and welfare analyses were
featured in this approach. Advocates of VAR approaches started with models that fit the data and
imposed minimal ground-up restrictions on time series processes that were only loosely motivated
by economic theory. Both groups retained the original Cowles emphasis of using state-of-the-art
44Appreciation of the importance of measurement error in economic data goes back to the work of Morgenstern
(1950). The importance and consequences of measurement error in microeconomic data is a running theme of the
work of Zvi Griliches. For a recent comprehensive analysis of measurement error in survey data see Bound, Brown
and Mathiowetz (2000).
45A quotation from Klein (1960), as presented in Epstein (1987, p. 119), reinforces this point:
"The building of institutional reality into a prthri formulations of economic relationships and the refinement of
basic data collection have contributed much more to the improvement of empirical econometric results than have
more elaborate methods of statistical inference".
25formal statistical methods to describe the data.
The VAR approach starts with a vector autoregression for a k-dimensional vector Z
(7) Z =C1Z1+ C2Z2 + ...+CqZtq + St
whereE(ss) =V,E(s) =0and s is uncorrelated with all variables dated t —1and earlier.
Under standard conditions, Ci, ...,Cand V can be estimated by least squares. Estimates of (7)
summarize the time-series data by matrices of regression parameters and the variance V. This
framework extends the Cowles model of equation (6) to a time-series setting. The "structural"
version of (7) is
(8) A0Z =A1Z1+ ...+AqZt—q + U
where A0 is assumed to be non-singular and the A1 are kx k matrices of constants and E(UUfl =D
and A0s =U.The original Cowles model assumed that A1 =0,i > 1,
Zt=[YtXe]andAo=[ ].
The"0" in the lower left block made X exogenous or external -itdetermined Y, but was not
determined by it.
Equations (7) and (8) extend the Cowles framework to account for serial correlation and general
dynamic responses across equations. Equation (7) and (8) are connected by the relationships
C =AU'A1and V =A&1D(A&1)'.Restrictions on the A, and D serve to identify the structural
model (8). The link to an explicit dynamic economic theory is at best weak. (Hansen and Sargent,
1991). Fully specified dynamic economic models can rarely be cast in the form of equations (7)
and (8).
Innovation accounting-estimating the effects of innovations in Ut on the time paths of the Z —
isprominently featured in this literature. Such accounting takes the place of simple comparative
statics exercises in the original Cowles models and traces out the dynamic response of exogenous
shocks on the outcome variables using (8). In order to recover the U2 from the estimated s to
perform such accounting exercises, it is necessary to impose some structure on the model (8).
While Sims (1980) and others criticize the practice of "incredible" identification as practiced
by Cowles econometricians, to outsiders the substitute sources of identification advocated in this
literature look no more credible and often appear to be of the same character.
26A variety of identifying conventions only loosely motived by economic theory have been as-
sumed. The leading approach is to adopt a causal chain approach and assume that D is diagonal
and A0 is triangular. As noted by many analysts, such restrictions are intrinsically arbitrary.
Other conventions, as summarized in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) include imposing
other restrictions on the A and the D to accord with features of the model viewed to be intu-
itively satisfactory such as long-run neutrality of certain variables.46 (See also Shapiro and Watson,
1988.) Alternative identifying assumptions produce different estimates of the importance of the
innovations. The goals of estimating the impacts of new policies never previously experienced or
of assessing the welfare consequences of existing policies are abandoned.47 Vector autoregression
data summaries are not transparent to outsiders. An air of mystery and controversy surrounds
the generation of the "facts" as summarized by (7). The appeal to modern time-series methods
appears to substitute the black box of Cowles identification with the black box of time-series
identification.
A second response to the perceived empirical failure of the Cowles research program was to
develop more explicit structural models and to exploit new sources of micro data. About the
same time that disillusionment was setting in with the Cowles methods, a vast new array of micro
data in the form of panels and cross-sections became available to economists. Orcutt (1952) had
forcefully argued that time-series variation was too limited to empirically recover the parameters
of structural models and that use of micro data cross-sections and panels would greatly aid in
this regard. New sources of microdata became available, in part through the pioneering efforts of
the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, and in part because government
agencies disseminated microfiles from Census and Current Population survey data.
Microeconometrics began to flourish as a separate field. Regression analysis as synthesized by
Goldberger (1964) was the tool of choice for analyzing this data. A wealth of empirical regularities
was presented and new econometric methods were developed to solve problems of censoring, self-
selection and limited dependent variables that arose in the analysis of micro data, and to develop
16Neutrality restricts certain sums of coefficients to be zero.
47Sims (1986) proposes a form of time series interpolation/extrapolation to assess the impacts of new policies,
but does not discuss the construction of welfare measures.
27new methods to exploit cross-section and panel data.48
With the advent of computers, the pace of empirical work increased dramatically in macro-
and microeconomics. This forever changed the scale of the empirical enterprise in economics and
created the phenomenon of a software-driven applied econometrics. Long tables of regression
coefficients with different conditioning variables became commonplace in research papers and
interpretation of estimates was difficnlt.19 "Holding variables constant in the sense of linear
regression" became the operational empirical counterpart of Marshall's ceteris paribus clause.
Endogeneity bias was always a concern, and many of the careful empirical studies of the day
accounted for such bias, although the precision of the estimates was usually greatly reduced when
corrections for endogeneity were made, especially in the micro studies where instruments were
usually weak.
The flood of often uninterpretable estimates that trose from this research activity produced
a new demand for structural models to organize the data and facilitate comparisons of estimates
across studies. Jorgenson's (1963) powerfully simple model of the demand for capital showed the
value of structural econometric models for interpreting data and focusing empirical research on
essential economic ideas. In one variablethe user cost of capitalJorgenson was able to
summarize the essential features of an important theory of investment. The simplicity and the
elegance of his empirical analysis contrasted sharply with the long and uninterpretable tables of
regression coefficients reported in studies of investment prior to Jorgenson's. Although serious
empirical objections were raised against his theory, its interpretability was never questioned.
Jacob Mincer's study of female labor supply (1962) was equally influential in demonstrating the
power of a simple structural model to organize evidence and predict phenomena. By introducing
wage and income effects into the empirical analysis of labor supply, he was able to reconcile
empirical anomalies between time-series and cross-section estimates of female labor supply, and
was able to explain the time series of female labor supply using a parsimonious, economically
interpretable framework.
48Amemiya (1985) and Hsiao (1986) provide comprehensive discussions of these new methods.
49Milton Friedman in a private conversation recalled the days at the NBER in the 1930s when extensive formal
discussions were required to justify the substantial cost of adding an additional regressor to an equation.
28The interpretability of structural estimates and the value of structural models in constructing
counterfactuals spurred the structural estimation movement in the 1970s and early 1980s.5° The
"Lucas Critique" suggested that properly specified structural models would avoid the problem
of parameter drift in estimated macro models. This instability was especially pronounced in the
estimation of the "Phillip's Curve" in the late 60s and early 70s. The quest for policy invariant
structural equations in macroeconomics stimulated a flood of theoretical papers and a trickle of
empirical ones.5' A parallel movement emerged in microeconomics where research on labor supply,
selection bias, the returns to schooling, the causal effect of unions on wages, and the determinants
of unemployment flourished.
The theoretical distinctions introduced in the post-Cowles Commission structural estimation
literatures are of fundamental lasting importance. They demonstrate what can be extracted from
the data provided sufficient prior knowledge is assumed. These models extend the Cowles paradigm
by specifying preferences, technology, and expectations and by addressing the identification of
structural parameters in a variety of empirical settings.
At the same time, the empirical track record from the structural research program is not
impressive. Computational limitations have hindered progress. Typically only the simplest of
structural models can be estimated and these are often rejected in the data, a point vigorously
emphasized by advocates of the VAR program. Few structural models have been estimated that
systematically account for the vast array of economic policies that confront the agents being
analyzed. In practice, analysts seeking policy-invariant structural parameters to conduct policy
evaluation typically have ignored the policies in place when estimating the structural parameters.
Moreover, the functional forms that facilitate structural estimation are often inconsistent with the
data.
Euler equation estimation methods developed in the 1980s and l990s became popular because
they avoid the computational cost of full structural estimation and enable analysts to estimate
one structural parameter under weaker assumptions than are required to estimate full structural
'°This dating is only rough. In industrial organization, structural modelling began to be practiced in the late
1980s and is an active frontier area of research in that field.
'1See the collection edited by Lucas and Sargent (1981).
29equation systems. In this sense, the Euler equation methods are more robust than full system
structural estimates.52 By estimating a few parameters of empirical models that are not capable of
generating forecasts of the levels of the variables, it is possible to avoid embarrassing confrontations
with the data. At the same time, pursuit of this research program was tantamount to abandonment
of the Cowles program for macro policy evaluation.53
In many quarters of economics, the evidence from structural econometric models is held to be
unreliable. An influential book by a leading empirical labor economist, H. Gregg Lewis (1986),
is typical of the response to structural econometrics by many empirical economists. Reviewing
estimates of the structural (causal) effect of unionism on wages that correct for self-selection into
union status -—theaverage effect of unionism on those who were unionized holding their observed
and unobserved personal characteristics fixedLewis found a wide range of estimates from
different econometric methods, and different conditioning variables. This variability led him to
dismiss structural equation methods as unreliable, and to advocate a return to more familiar least
squares methods that apparently generate more robust estimates. Similar findings were reported
for the estimates of structural labor supply parameters. (Killingsworth, 1983, Table 4.3)
In fairness to the structural approach, some of the variability reported in the empirical lit-
erature arises from the imposition of false over-identifying restrictions about distributions and
unobservables that could have been tested and relaxed, but typically were not. Part of the vari-
ability in the estimates emphasized by Lewis (1986, Table 4.2) arises from the variation in the
conditioning variables and choices of combinations of functional forms and identifying assump-
tions. Different conditioning sets and different estimators define different structural parameters.54
This is an intrinsic feature of structural models, not of econometric methods. Lewis was frustrated
by the failure of a purely empirical approach to solve a causal problem, and the difficult task of
working backward from the assumptions embedded in any particular empirical study to explain
why its results are different from any other.
02However,the range of estimates produced in the Euler equation literature itself vary widely. See e.g. Browning
and Lusardi (1996).
53Summers (1991) presents a vigorous critique of the Euler equation research program and questions its contri-
butions to economic knowledge.
54This problem is discussed in Heckman (1990) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
30Lewis' evidence on the sensitivity of estimates of causal parameters to alternative identifying
assumptions does not demonstrate the impossibility of estimating a causal effect of unions on
wages. Assuming that the functional form of population wage equations is known, the only safe
conclusions that can be drawn from his study are (a) selection bias is an empirically important
problem in estimating the causal effect of unions on wages, and (b) different identifying assump—
tions produce different estimates of the causal parameters.55 Only if selection bias is not a problem
will different methods for solving the selection problem estimate the same causal effect. The only
way to "solve" the problem of parameter variability reported in the empirical literature in labor
economics is to develop different economic models to evaluate the plausibility of the different as-
sumptions used to generate the estimates. No purely empirical method is available. Agreeing to
report only least squares estimates establishes a convention that is easy to follow but that evades
the stated causal question.
Lewis' reaction to the variability of structural estimates under different identifying assumptions
is typical of the reaction to structural models by many economists. In application, structural
econometricians often impose onto the data many assumptions not intrinsic to the economics of
the problem for the sake of computational convenience. In many applications of the method, and
of VAR methods, there is an appeal to formal statistical methods that has "black box" feature and
the numbers produced using them are often not perceived to be transparent or easily replicable.
The quest for transparency underlies all of the recent research programs in econometrics, although
there is no agreement over what constitutes transparency.
Methods developed in nonparametric econometrics and sensitivity analysis in statistics in prin-
ciple reduce some of this arbitrariness. Nonparametric identification analyses reveal whether causal
distinctions are made solely on the basis of distributional assumptions or on the basis of functional
form assumptions. They open up the black box of parametric econometrics to establish the sources
55These are my conclusions and not his. Note that the assumption of correct specification of population wage
functions wasnotquestioned by Lewis. In labor economics, it is presumed that the "Mincer equation" is the correct
functional form for an earnings equation. See Mincer (1974).
31of identification of economic models.56
Those promoting calibration as a method for determining the parameters of structural models
emphasize the value of securing transparent estimates for structural equations and further empha-
size the conditionalmodel dependentnature of empirical knowledge. Like Lewis, they reject
the black box features of structural estimation. Unlike Lewis, they seek to resolve empirical ambi-
guities by developing the economic theory. Unlike the VAR econometricians, the calibrators focus
on a few main correlations and means and build explicit models to account for them. Unlike the
structural econometricians, and the VAR econometricians, formal statistical models are not used
by this group and the goodness-of-fit of models is deemphasized as a model evaluation criterion.
A third response to the structural equation program is that of the more empirically oriented
natural experiment movement, which is loosely allied with, and takes its inspiration from the
social experiment movement. Like the calibrators, practitioners of this approach seek transparent
estimates obtained from simple econometric methods because transparency and simplicity promote
replicability and understanding. Like the VAR econometricians, this group attempts to ground
its activities in the data, although it does not use time series methods, and tends to deemphasize
formal discussions of econometric methods. A hallmark of this approach is the quest for plausible
sources of external variation to solve identification problems, with the ideal being a randomization
that does not alter the causal relationship being studied. Like the nonparametric econometricians,
advocates of natural experiments distinguish what is in the data from what has to be added to it
to obtain estimates of causal parameters. The emphasis is on recovering causal parameters and
not on evaluating the effects of new policies or the welfare consequences of policies already in
place. I discuss each of these research programs in turn.
3.1. Understanding the Limitations of the Data: Bounding and Sensitivity
Analysis
In response to the evident variation of the estimates produced from many parametric econo-
metric models, econometricians have increasingly emphasized separating aspects of an estimation
56For example, Flinn and Heckman (1982) establish the nonparametric non-identifiability of the stationary job
search model of unemployment relative to data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and demonstrate
the extreme sensitivity of structural estimates derived from this model to alternative distributional assumptions.
32that require out-of-sample extrapolation or imposition of difficult-to-justify functional forms, from
aspects of an estimation that are based on sample information and are nonparametrically identi-
fied.
Exploring the limits of identification, this line of work also considers the restrictions placed
on ranges of parameter values when models are not formally identified. The paradigm for this
line of work goes back to the research of Marschak and Andrews (1944) who present ranges of
estimates for the structural parameters of firm production functions that are consistent with biased
least squares estimates.37 Marschak and Andrews work within the context of an under-identified
parametric model. More recent work emphasizes more nonparametric approaches to perform this
type of bounding and sensitivity analysis.
Recent prototypes for this separation of conjectural from factual information are studies by
Smith and Welch (1986), Glynn, Laird and Rubin (1986), Holland (1986) and Rosenbanm (1995)
who analyze the standard selection problem that is at the heart of Lewis' problem of recovering
the union-nonunion wage differential. Smith and Welch consider identification of means. Glynn,
Laird and Rubin, Holland, and Rosenbaum consider identification of entire distributions.
To illustrate these ideas in the simplest possible setting, let f(W D =1)be the density of
outcomes (e.g. wages) for persons who work (D =1corresponds to work). Suppose that we know
Pr(D =1Z) where Z is a vector of determinants of work. Hence we know Pr(D =0Z).
Missing is f(W D =0)e.g.wagesof non-workers.58 In order to estimate E(W IZ),Smith and
Welch (1986) use the law of iterated expectations to obtain
E(WIZ)=E(WD=1,Z)Pr(D=1IZ)+E(WID=0,Z)Pr(D0Z).
To estimate the left-hand side of this expression, it is necessary to obtain information on the
missing component E(W D =0,Z). Smith and Welch propose and implement bounds on
E(WD = 0,Z) e.g.
WL<E(WID=0,Z)￿W,
37Wright (1934) presents ranges of estimates for under-identified path coefficient models.
581n Lewis' unionism problem, there are two sets of missing data: the wnges that nonunion workers would earn
if they were union workers and the wages that union workers would earn i they were nonunion workers. I analyze
the selection problem for one case only to simplify the exposition.




By doing a sensitivity analysis, they produce a range of values for E(W Z) that are explicitly
dependent on the range of values assumed for E(W D =0,Z)P°
Glynn, Laird, and Rubin (1986) present a sensitivity analysis for distributions using Bayesian
methods under a variety of different assumptions. Letting F denote a distribution, by the law of
iterated expectations,
F(WIZ)=F(WD=1,Z)Pr(D=1Z)+F(WD=0,Z)Pr(D=0JZ).
Sensitivity analysis using alternative values of F(W D =0,Z) is performed to determine a range
of values of F(W Z). Holland (1986) and Rosenbaum (in a series of papers starting in the early
1980s and summarized in 1995) consider more classical sensitivity analyses that vary the ranges
of parameters of models.
The objective of the Smith-Welch bounds and the Bayesian and classical sensitivity analyses
is to clearly separate what is known from what is conjectured about the data, and to explore the
sensitivity of reported estimates to the assumptions used to secure them. Work on nonparametric
identification by Heckman (1990), Heckman and Honoré (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998)
examines nonparametric assumptions required to identify selection models from infinite samples.
This work establishes "what is in the data" and what has to be imposed on it to make different
causal distinctions.
Some of the analysis presented in the recent literature is nonparametric although in practice,
high-dimensional nonparametric estimation is not feasible. However, feasible parametric versions
of these methods run the risk of imposing the false parametric structure used in estimating the
structural models that is so deeply criticized by advocates of this approach. These methods also
591n their problem there are plausible ranges of wages which dropouts can earn.
60Later work by Manski (1995) and Robins (1989) develops this type of analysis more systematically. Bathe and
Pearl (1997) present an elegant approach to the problem of incorporating multiple sources of prior information
using linear programming methods.
34depend critically on the choice of conditioning variables Z.Inprinciple, all possible choices of the
conditioning variables should be explored, especially in computing bounds for all possible models.
although in practice this is never done. If it were, the range of estimates produced by the bounds
would be substantialP
A fully nonparametric approach in deriving estimates or bounds for causal parameters is un-
likely to produce useful results, although semiparametric models to compute bounds and estimate
causal models are beginning to be used on a wide scale. Explorations of bounds with simple func-
tional forms of the sort advocated and implemented by Marschak and Andrews (1944) are likely
to be more informative.62 Unless some assumptions about functional forms are maintained, as in
the parametric or semiparametric literatures, economic data are unlikely to be very informative
about causal parameters, especially when there are many possible conditioning variables.
3.2. The Calibration Movement
The development of dynamic economic theory and computable general equilibrium theory in
the mid 1960s posed a serious challenge to structural econometrics. Unlike the simple static
theory of demand, or the simple Keynesian models that defined the structural econometrics of the
1940s and 1950s, recursive dynamic theory does not typically produce simple functional forms for
estimating equations. Vector autoregression models like (7) and (8) rarely capture the dynamic
economic theory in an explicit way (Hansen and Sargent, 1980, 1991). Problems of estimating
the parameters of large-scale static general equilibrium models are equally formidable.
Many of these new dynamic models produce a rich dynamics with qualitative properties that
depend critically on values assumed by parameters. Thus, while dynamic theory needs good
empirical input to determine which qualitative properties are empirically relevant, at the same time
there are computational problems that make estimation of the required parameters a formidable
61 term "nonparametric" is actually something of a misnomer. In finite samples, all nonparametric methods
are parametric. The choices of the parameterization are dictated by properties possessed by these functions as
samples become infinite, and not by their economic interpretability —thecriterion adopted in the older parameteric
structural literature. The semiparametric econometric literature relaxes some of the parametric assumptions of
parametric models, while retaining the remaining parametric structure. Semiparametric estimation methods are
more suited for samples of the size available to economists and for that reason are more widely used. See the
discussion in Fleckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
62 for the regression coefficients in errors in variables models are developed by Klepper and Leamer (1984).
35task. This computational challenge is so great that a new field of computational economics,
concerned solely with simulation of these models, has opened up. (See, e.g.Amman,Kendrick
and Rust, 1996).
In an attempt to anchor the theory in data, and to use the theory to produce counterfactual
policy simulations, calibration has come into use on a wide scale. In static general equilibrium
models, the practice is to pick simple functional forms (typically Cobb-Douglas) and fit one cross-
section exactly using share data. (See Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley, 1999). In the real
business cycle models, parameters are picked from time-series averages to match the parameters
of simple models that produce growth steady states (see, e.g.Cooleyand Prescott, 1995). In other
branches of this literature, calibrators pick parameters from micro studies. This practice has been
criticized because the source micro models are often based on assumptions about the economic
environments that are incompatible with the assumptions of the calibrated macro model. (Hansen
and Heckman, 1996).
This research program emphasizes interpretability of the estimates in terms of economic mod-
els and subjects the calibrated models to rigorous internal consistency checks. Certain features
of data (elements of the source space 8) become the focus of attention while others are ignored.
Overall fit of the model is deemphasized and formal testing programs are explicitly rejected. There
is no attempt to account for the time-series correlations in the fashion of the VAR econometri-
cians. Current approaches to producing the estimates for this class of causal models are casual,
although in its defense, the econometrics is transparent and often avoids the black-box features of
standard structural econometrics and the problems of determining the appropriate representation
of economic time series that plague the VAR approach. Some have argued that the calibrators
are transparently wrong. When real business cycle models fit by calibration have been subject to
rigorous empirical testing of the sort used in VAR econometrics, they have performed poorly in
terms of goodness-of-fit criteria. (Watson, 1993).
Given the weak empirical foundations for these models, it is not surprising that the policy
counterfactuals based on them are controversial and few outside the subfield take the estimates of
the welfare consequences of policies produced by this line of research very seriously. At the same
time, the models are intellectually interesting frameworks and demonstrate what is logically possi-
36ble. Anchoring them in data, however loosely, gives them some plausibility. Routinely performed
sensitivity analyses reveal which parameters are crucial and which are not important (Auerbach
and Kotlikoff, 1987). These findings serve to direct the attention of empirical analysts toward
estimating economically important parameters.
At the time of this writing, it is unclear whether the calibration movement is a transitional stage
that will be replaced by a more formal structural econometric research program, or a permanent
fixture of the economics landscape. In the life cycle of any class of general equilibrium models, it is
likely that calibration will be the first stage of empirical implementation and that formal structural
estimation will follow for the subclass of calibrated models that attract the most professional
attention.
3.3TheNatural Experiment Movement
A third response to the perceived failure of structural econometrics is the natural experiment
movement. Somewhat controversially, I include in this group advocates of social experiments.
This group, like the nonparametric econometricians, the statisticians who advocate sensitivity
analysis, and the calibrators, seeks transparency in its use of empirical evidence. The movement is
organized around the principle of finding good instruments (in the sense of section 2.2) as inputs
into a standard instrumental variable estimator of causal parameters that is simple to estimate
and easy to replicate. Randomization is often held to be the ideal instrument.63
Unlike the calibrators, members of this movement are much less concerned about estimating
structural parameters derived from economic theory. The emphasis is on identifying causal para-
meters, intuitively defined. By not tying the empirical work to any specific economic model, the
evidence produced from this approach appears to be relevant to a wider class of models although
the link to any specific model is weaker. Simultaneity and self-selection are recognized as poten-
tially important problems, but simple solutions to them are sought using transparent, replicable,
instrumental variables methods or difference-in-differences methods.64 Given the emphasis on in-
63Social experiments are sometimes alleged to be the "gold standard" for causal inference. For one discussion
of the problems arising in implementing social experiments and for the interpretation of social experiments as
instruments, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
64Differences-in-differences are a form of instrumental variables method. See Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998)
and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
37tuitively defined causal parameters as opposed to structural parameters, thisgroup eschews formal
presentations of economic theory to motivate empirical models, as is favored by the calibrators, or
explicit statements of identifying assumptions which characterize the analyses of nonparametric
econometricians.
Applications of this approach often run the risk of producing estimates of causalparame-
ters that are difficult to interpret. Like the evidence produced in VAR accounting exercises, the
evidence produced by this school is difficult to relate to the body of evidence about the basic behav-
ioral elasticities of economics. The lack of a theoretical framework makes it difficult to cumulate
findings across studies, or to compare the findings of one study with another. Many applications
of this approach produce estimates very similar to biostatistical "treatment effects" withoutany
clear economic interpretation.65 The less explicit discussion about economic models and sources
of identification that characterizes much of the research conducted in this style sometimes creates
the impression that the reported empirical evidence is more robust than the empirical evidence
produced from research programs that adopt a more explicitly qualified approach in interpreting
evidence.
This group, like the VAR econometricians, stresses empirical credibility, intuitive plausibility,
and replicability. Analysts working within this paradigm have produced an important body of
factual knowledge. Like the nonparametric econometricians, this group emphasizes the limits of
empirical knowledge. Counterfactual questions about the effects of new policies, never previously
implemented, are viewed as empirically impossible to answer. Explanation is emphasized over
prediction. When prediction is performed, it is done using interpolation or extrapolation of ex-
isting estimates rather than the formal methods advocated in the econometric policy evaluation
literature.
4. The Adequacy of the Cowles Research Program as a Guide to Learning
from Data
At the time the Cowles analysts were developing their body of theory, classical statistical infer-
65Flowever, some structural approaches are subject to the same criticism. Thus in the structural union wage
literature, the "treatment" of unionism is often estimated rather than the direct economic effects of unionism on
technology, labor supply and factor substitution.
38ence as embodied in the work of Neyman and Pearson (1933) had a virtual intellectual monopoly
in statistics. That approach emphasized the formal testing of models arrived at through a priori
means. Haavelmo (1944) synthesized the Cowles approach with the Neyman-Pearson approach in
his Nobel-Prize-winning foundational essay.
Few empiricists now embrace the Cowles research program advanced by Haavelmo that remains
the credo of most structural econometricians and is implicitly advocated in most econometrics
textbooks. The Haavelmo program is a vision of induction on causal parameters produced from
well-defined structural economic models derived from explicitly articulated axioms. This approach
to empirical analysis and model testing seems foreign to many empirically oriented economists who
favor more interaction between models and data than is envisioned in the Haavelmo paradigm.
This difference in approach to empirical analysis is a major dividing line between structural econo-
metricians and most other empirical economists.
Classical statistics separates the act of constructing a model from the act of verifying it.
Two fundamental assumptions underlie this approach. The first assumption is that a set of
consequential facts (the source space 8) is fixed in advance of conducting an empirical analysis or
in advance of writing down formal economic models to describe the available data. The second
assumption is that the set of models that live in M is fixed in advance of looking at the data. The
task of constructing theoretical models is assumed to be divorced from the task of using data to
test them.
Separation between model formation and data analysis does not describe much empirical re-
search activity in economics or in any other scientific field. Yet it is a cornerstone of classical
statistics and the Popper (1959) falsificationist program which is the official paradigm of econo-
metrics and classical statistics. The Haavelmo program offers a very rigid vision of empirical
analysis. It ignores the interactive nature of the empirical learning process that moves between
theory and data, a process that is central to the act of creating empirical knowledge. It is not infor-
mative about what steps to take in response to the rejection of a model, nor about the implications
of any response for the interpretation of test statistics used in subsequent tests.66
66Friedman (1953, p. 12, footnote 11) was an early critic of the Haavelmo program. He claimed that the choice
of a class of models often forced the conclusions of an empirical study. Morgan (1990) presents an illuminating
39The set of available models used to analyze a given body of data is never thced in advance of
looking at it. Inspection of the data usually suggests new models and the new models may in turn
suggest collecting new dataor more careful examination of old data including addition of "extra"
variables to the source space S in the light of new theoretical insights. The Haavelmoprogram
does not describe this empirical learning process. Nor does a Bayesian version of it. Neither
captures the act of discovery of new models not previously contemplated that are suggested by
analysis of the data or the insight that a model may produce about new sources of data to test
it.67 While there are serious problems in using the data that suggest a theory to test that theory,
even more important problems arise from refusing to learn from the data in revising economic
models.
Sample reuse vitiates standard testing procedures, and reported t values do not convey the
information traditionally assigned to them. Bayesian methods are more flexible in this regard but
like the classical methods they do not allow for surprise (i.e. new discoveries previously thought
to be impossible or not thought about prior to seeing the data). Only tests on fresh data with
different distributions of forcing variables provide convincing verification of a model.68
In many areas of economics there are few precisely formulated models that are known in
advance of looking at the data. Usually a lot of vague a priori notions seem equally plausible as
theoretical points of departure. In such settings, identification analyses are necessarily informal
because the theory is not tightly specified and the VAR and natural experiment research programs
may be good starting points for initial data explorations.
The econometric paradigm of the identification problem and the notion of a precise theory
discussion of the failure of the Cowles group to produce a model for learning from the data.
°TThe program of model testing and "encompassing" advocated by Hendry and Richard (1982) appeals to the
Haavelmo program and suffers from the same criticism. It proposes a priori specification of a large class of models
and use of classical significance tests to test down from a general model. This influential research program does not
account for non-nested hypotheses and does not account for learning about new models not previously contemplated
(and placed in the a priori encompassing specification). Tests conducted within the Hendry and Richard program
are sensitive to the order in which they are performed.
Replications of the same model on the same type of data (i.e. data with the same distributions of variables)
are unlikely to be informative. One can replicate the same misspecified results in each instance. Only if analysts
use models on data sets with different distributions of external forcing variables will differences in models due to
misspecification be detected.
40constructed in advance of the evidence do not apply to areas of social science where knowledge
is not settled. It may describe a mature science built on numerous previous empirical studies
conducted under other research paradigms where empirical regularities about a phenomenon have
accumulated. In this regard the vision of empirical research in economics conducted within the
paradigm of the Haavelmo program is a very limited one. Econometricians operating within the
Haavelmo paradigm too easily forget that a priori theories specified in advance of looking at
the data are often just condensations of accumulated empirical knowledge acquired using crude
empirical methods.
Leamer's anthropology of econometric practice (1978) and the recent study of the use of "tacit
knowledge" in econometric practice by Magnus and Morgan (1999), demonstrate that in practice
the Haavelmo program of specifying models in advance of the data is rarely used although test
statistics are reported as if it had been used. While interest in causal models and causal questions
motivates empirical studies, the rules for induction to generate empirical causal models that were
prescribed by Haavelmo and the Cowles group are typically ignored.69
No successful mechanical algorithm for discovering causal or structural models has yet been
produced, and it is unlikely that one will ever be found.7° At the same time, it is unlikely that the
quest for a mechanical algorithm for determining causality from data will ever be abandoned.71
The tension between the use of tacit knowledge and formal algorithmic methods is likely to be a
permanent feature of empirical research in economics. It arises because in most empirical studies
there is always more knowledge about a problem being studied than appears in the sampling
distributions of the measured variables being analyzed or in well-specified Bayesian priors. The
best empirical work in economics uses economic theory as a framework for integrating all of the
available evidence, tacit and algorithmic, to tell a convincing story.
As documented by Leamer (1978), creative empirical work is often presented as if it has been
"9One contributing factor was the emergence of rival schools of statistical inference and the breakdown in the
consensus about the appropriate way to do empirical research.
70This debate has a counterpart in the debate in the artificial intelligence community over whether machines can
think. (See Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986).
Glymour and Cooper (1999) for a variety of algorithms for mechanically producing causal parameters from
data.
41conducted within the Haavelmo paradigm, while iu fact, it is not. The format of the Haavelmo
program is merely used as a reporting style to accord with the official rhetoric of econometrics.72
5. Conclusions And a Vision of the Future
In the smoke of battle over the "correct" way to do empirical research in economics, it is easy
to lose sight of the important and enduring contributions that twentieth century econometrics has
made to knowledge. Its fundamental contributions include establishing formally that causality
is a property of a model, that many models may explain the same data and that assumptions
must be made to identify causal or structural models. It extended nineteenth century notions of
causality by recognizing the possibility of interrelationships among causes. Econometrics clarified
the conditional nature of causal knowledge and the impossibility of a purely empirical approach to
analyzing causal questions. The information required to evaluate economic policies and to forecast
the effects of new policies was carefully delineated.
Economists respond differently to these universally agreed-upon principles. Some embrace
a style that emphasizes the conditional nature of causal knowledge while others embrace a style
that deemphasizes it. All agree that identification of structural or causal relationships is a difficult
task. The apparent empirical failure of many structural research efforts, developed in the 1970s and
1980s, to produce credible estimates of economic parameters and causal relationships motivates
current research programs. A desire for clearer, more transparent, sources of identification of
causal effects is a common goal.
Disagreements arise over the interpretation of what constitutes transparency, reporting styles,
the identifying assumptions that different groups are willing to make, and the emphasis placed
on linking empirical work to explicit economic models. The different approaches to empirical
research in economics have much to learn from each other. Structural methods will be more
widely accepted if sensitivity analyses are conducted, the consequences of functional form and
distributional assumptions are investigated, and nonparametric or semiparametric methods are
used. With the continuing decline in computer costs, such sensitivity studies will become feasible.
The natural experiment movement will gain a wider following if it becomes more integrated with
economics. It will produce a cumulative body of knowledge if economic theory is used to guide the
T2See McCloskey (1985) on the important role of rhetoric in economic discourse.
42choice of estimating equations arid to report estimates.73 Similarly, social experiments that use
experimental variation to identify economic parameters rather than program-specific treatment
effects are more likely to produce cumulative knowledge.71
The calibration movement will produce more credible empirical estimates if it draws on the
estimates produced from a more data-sensitive structural econometrics movementand a more
economics-sensitive natural experiment movement, if it uses microestimates obtained from empir-
ical models consistent with the macro-general equilibrium frameworks and if it subjectscalibrated
models to the rigorous time-series tests advocated by VAR econometricians. The boundingand
sensitivity analysis movement is likely to be more influential if it relies on expliciteconomic models
and uses economically interpretable structures to conduct semiparametric bounding and sensitivity
analyses.75
It is far from obvious that these divergent empirical practices will ever converge to a common
practice for extracting causal parameters and conducting policy analysis.The Cowles Commission
presented a bold program of causal analysis and policy evaluationthat has proved difficult to
operationalize in practice. Later developments in dynamic general equilibrium theoryand game
theory have not made structural estimation any easier. Respondingto this difficulty is a major
source of anxiety and tension in empirical economics.Those most strongly motivated by its
theoretical vision are less easily discouraged by the empirical failings of the Cowles program.Those
most strongly motivated to describe the economic world, rather than to explain it, orpredict the
effects of new policies, are acutely aware of the empirical limitations of highlystructured models.
Some of the disagreement that arises in interpreting a given bodyof data is intrinsic to the
73The analyses of Card (1999) and Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) demonstrate how simpleeconomic models
of the returns to schooling clarify the benefits and limitations of instrumental variablesmethods. In particular,
Heckman and Vytlacil show that Card's assumption that foregone earnings are not a costof schooling is critical
to the successful application of the method of instrumental variables to estimatingthe rate of return to schooling.
Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) demonstrate the value of economicmodels in interpreting policy parameters
estimated by difference-in-differences methods. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) demonstratethe power of natural
experiment twins data to test an otherwise unidentified economicmodel of fertility.
T4The original goal of the social experimentation movement was to recover structural parameters to perform
econometric policy evaluation. See Orcutt and Orcutt (1968) and Cain and Watts (1973).See the discussion in
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
75The analysis of Marschak and Andrews (1944) is a good parametric paradigm. A more recent analysisis that
of Viverberg (1993).
43field of economics because of the conditional nature of causal knowledge. The information in
any body of data is usually too weak to eliminate competing causal explanations of the same
phenomenon. There is no mechanical algorithm for producing a set of "assumption free" facts or
causal estimates based on those facts. In reaching this understanding, economists partcompany
with statisticians who, as a group, still fail to understand this important lesson of twentieth century
econometrics, and advocate purely empirical approaches for determining causal relationships.76
The only certain routes for eliminating some of the disagreement among economists who maintain
different identifying assumptions are through collecting better data and stating differences in
identifying assumptions more clearly.77 Economic theory as a framework for interpretation and
synthesis is an inseparable part of good empirical research in economics. These are major lessons
of twentieth century econometrics.
76There is considerable irony in the observation that some econometricians in the recent "treatment effect"
literature have turned for guidance to statistics to obtain frameworks for interpreting causal laws while statisticians
and experts in artificial intelligence such as many writing in Glymour and Cooper (1999) have turned to Cowles
econometrics for clear definitions of causality within a model.
T7Throughout this essay, I have taken it as self-evident that the introduction of new data sources has greatly
enriched economic knowledge. To cite only a few major contributors, the research of Kuznets on national income
(1937), and economic growth (1973), Summers and Heston (1991) on international comparisons and Griliches (1995)
on research and development have had a major influence on our profession.
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